Trump Issues Ultimatum to NATO: Stop Buying Russian Oil or No New U.S. Sanctions

Trump Issues Ultimatum to NATO: Stop Buying Russian Oil or No New U.S. Sanctions, and He Wants Tariffs on China and India

President Donald Trump on Saturday set a stark condition for any new U.S. sanctions on Russia, telling NATO allies that Washington will only move to tighten economic pressure on Moscow if all member states simultaneously cease purchasing Russian oil. In the same set of remarks and posts, Mr. Trump urged allied governments to slap steep tariffs — as high as 50% to 100% — on China (and in earlier appeals, on India) to punish third-party buyers of Russian energy and squeeze President Vladimir Putin’s war chest. The ultimatum immediately produced alarm in European capitals, skepticism from trade officials and renewed market nervousness about energy supplies and global commerce. 

Mr. Trump framed the demand in blunt strategic terms: choke off the customers, he argued, and Moscow’s finances would collapse, forcing the Kremlin to come to a negotiating table. He said he was “ready to do major Sanctions on Russia” but conditioned that step on unified action by NATO to stop buying Russian crude. Separately, he floated plans for steep tariffs on Chinese imports as a lever to punish Beijing for continuing to take discounted Russian oil — a proposal that would mark an abrupt expansion of trade coercion into a major geopolitical tool. 

The reaction from Europe was immediate and cool. EU officials and several national governments said they share the objective of cutting Russian energy revenue, but they warned the scale and speed Mr. Trump demanded — and the idea of sweeping reciprocal tariffs on China and India — would be politically, economically and legally fraught. Brussels has been weighing tighter measures against Moscow, including additional sanctions and enforcement steps against so-called “shadow fleets” and intermediaries that help Russia ship oil, but many member states remain heavily exposed to energy costs and complex supply chains that make instant, sweeping embargoes unrealistic. Several European diplomats said publicly that a coordinated approach to choke points such as shipping, insurance and payment mechanisms was more practical than a blunt stoppage or punitive tariffs. 

Washington’s own economic team has argued privately that tougher measures — including secondary penalties on third-party buyers — could exert real pressure on the Russian economy. U.S. Treasury officials have discussed tools ranging from financial restrictions to tariffs that would target countries and companies still purchasing Russian crude, a strategy senior U.S. officials say could amplify earlier sanctions regimes. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has publicly suggested that coordinated sanctions and secondary measures might push Russia into a deep economic contraction and force political concessions. But even within allied capitals, that scenario prompts gnawing questions about blowback: higher global oil prices, economic pain for third-party importers and the risk that buyers will accelerate alternative arrangements to circumvent Western levers. 

Practical and legal hurdles are significant. A coordinated NATO embargo on Russian oil would require unanimity among 31 member states and would likely collide with contractual and logistical realities: long-term supply contracts, refinery configurations tailored to specific crude grades, and the absence of immediate alternative suppliers at scale. Imposing tariffs on China or India — two of the world’s largest trading partners and energy consumers — would likely trigger WTO disputes, immediate retaliatory measures, and widescale disruption to global manufacturing and trade flows. EU diplomats said Washington’s tariff idea was “politically toxic” in many capitals and that Brussels was unlikely to adopt blanket duties of the magnitude Mr. Trump sought. 

Markets reacted nervously to the rhetoric. Oil prices saw upward pressure on the prospect of coordinated supply denial and the possibility that threatened tariffs and sanctions could reroute or choke current flows. Traders warned that even talk of a pan-Atlantic embargo or the prospect of punitive tariffs on major purchasers can spook markets and push energy and commodity prices higher, exacerbating inflationary pressures in energy-importing economies. Analysts also cautioned that heavy-handed trade penalties could accelerate buyers’ efforts to develop alternate payment and shipping channels — a cycle that would blunt Western leverage over time. 

New Delhi and Beijing reacted predictably: both governments rejected coercive measures and defended their energy-security choices. India, which has taken on larger volumes of discounted Russian crude since 2022, has already been the subject of recent U.S. tariff actions and public pressure; New Delhi has protested those moves and pushed back in diplomatic channels. China signalled that punitive tariffs would be unacceptable, with officials warning of reciprocal steps and underscoring that unilateral trade coercion could destabilise fragile global supply chains and economic recovery. Both countries emphasised that energy-security decisions are sovereign and driven by national needs. 

The political calculus in Washington also matters. Mr. Trump’s ultimatum comes amid an administration push to show toughness toward Moscow after renewed Russian strikes in Ukraine and rising domestic pressure to demonstrate decisive action. But the White House strategy faces a familiar dilemma: the more the U.S. seeks to weaponise trade against third parties, the more it risks fracturing the coalition it needs to enforce sanctions effectively. Allies who feel coerced rather than persuaded may look for ways to blunt the impact, from legal challenges to parallel dealings with non-Western partners. That prospect complicates the very unity Mr. Trump says is required. 

Analysts say there are more practical, targeted options short of a wholesale embargo or punitive tariffs. Those include tightening enforcement against ship-to-ship transfers and shadow fleets; constraining access to insurance and finance that make clandestine sales feasible; expanding the price-cap mechanism and lowering its threshold; and offering positive incentives — such as subsidised alternative supplies or constructive diplomatic engagement — to nudge large buyers away from Russian crude. Those options are operationally complex and politically sensitive but are viewed by many capitals as more sustainable than immediate, sweeping trade warfare.

What to watch next: European Commission and EU member-state reactions in the coming days; statements from NATO foreign ministers and a possible emergency discussion among ambassadors; market moves in oil and shipping insurance; and diplomatic messaging from New Delhi and Beijing. If Mr. Trump follows rhetoric with a formal proposal or an Executive Order, legal teams in Brussels and capitals worldwide will begin rapid assessments of trade-law exposure and likely retaliation scenarios. The broader test is whether the United States can translate ultimatum-style pressure into a durable, coordinated strategy that actually narrows Moscow’s options without splintering the coalition the West relies upon.

Analysis — bold tactic, fraught execution

President Trump’s ultimatum is a classic high-risk push: it may rally domestic supporters and force a public conversation about energy leverage, but it also plays to the West’s weakest political point — the difficulty democracies have in sustaining costly, coordinated economic pain. The strategic value of turning trade pains onto third-party buyers is clear on paper, but history suggests such measures often produce unintended consequences: market disruption, legal blowback and stronger incentives for the targeted countries to build alternatives. If the aim is to bring Putin to the negotiating table, policymakers must weigh whether short-term coercion will narrow his options or simply harden Moscow’s resolve while fracturing the coalition that must enforce any penalties.